Golden Spike Equipment Co., A Utah Corporation  v. Howard F. Croshaw : Appellant\u27s Brief by unknown
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs (cases filed before 1965)
1965
Golden Spike Equipment Co., A Utah Corporation
v. Howard F. Croshaw : Appellant's Brief
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc1
Original Brief submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; funding for digitization provided by the
Institute of Museum and Library Services through the Library Services and Technology Act,
administered by the Utah State Library, and sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library; machine-
generated OCR, may contain errors.L. Tom Perry and Ted S. Perry; Attorneys for Defendant-
Appellant Howard F. Croshaw.
This Brief of Appellant is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme
Court Briefs (cases filed before 1965) by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact
hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellant, Golden Spike Equipment v. Croshaw, No. 10266 (1965).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc1/4792
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
Page 
STATEMENT OF CASE -----------------------------·-··-------------·- 1 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT ---------------------------- 1 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL ---------------------------------- 2 
STATEMENT OF FACTS -------------------·------·---------------···- 2 
STATEMENT OF POINTS -----------------------------------·-----·-- 3 
ARGUMENT ----------------------------·--------------·----·---···----··-·-·----- 3 
I. The filing of a complaint declaring the entire 
amount of a conditional sales contract due and 
payable before maturity violates the buyer's right 
under Section 15-l-2a ( B) ( 4) Utah Code An-
notated, 1953, to pay the full indebtedness of the 





Dusenberry v. Taylor, 7 Utah 2nd 383, 325 P.2d 910 4, 5 
In re Stevens Estate, 107 Utah 255, 130 P.2d 85 ____________ 4 
STATUTES 
Section 15-l-2a, Utah Code Annotated, 1953 __________ 3, 4, 9 
OTHER AUTHORITIES 
50 American Jurisprudence, Statutes, Sections 225, 
227, and 429 -------------------------------------------------------------- 4, 7 
182 Corpus Juris Secondum Statutes, Sec. 322(2) ______ 4 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF 
THE STATE OF UTAH 
GOLDEN SPIKE EQUIPMENT CO., 
A Utah Corporation 
Plaintiff-Respondent 
vs. 
HOWARD F. CROSHAW, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF 
STATEMENT OF CASE 
No. 10266 
This is an action for the balance due on a conditional 
sales contract with a prayer for an order that the con-
ditionally purchased property be sold and that Plaintiff 
be given a judgment for the deficiency, if any. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
The Defendant's motion for Summary Judgment was 
denied and the case was tried before a jury who returned 
a verdict in favor of the Plaintiff. The Court entered 
judgment in favor of the Plaintiff in the amount of $941.54, 
plus interest at ten per cent from November 1, 1963, for 
$155.25 attorneys fees and costs. 
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
The defendant seeks a reversal of the judgment and 
a judgment granting defendant's motion for summary 
judgment dismissing the Plaintiff's complaint. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On July 30, 1963, Plaintiff, Golden Spike Equipment 
Company, sold Defendant, Howard F. Croshaw, a used 
1957 Combine on a conditional sales contract which pro-
vided for a cash price of $2500, a time price differential 
of $124.61, the balance to be paid in two installments, the 
first installment of $941.54 being due November 1, 1963, 
and the balance of $983.07 being due November 1, 1964. 
The Defendant did not pay the installment due November 
1, 1963. 
Defendant claimed the combine would not work, that 
the parties mutually cancelled the contract and the com-
bine was returned to the Plaintiff prior to the commence-
ment of this action. On May 20, 1964, Plaintiff filed a 
complaint declaring the entire balance of the contract 
due and payable in the amount of $1924.61 together with 
interest, attorney's fees and costs and asked that the com-
bine be sold and Plaintiff be given a judgment for the 
deficiency if any. The Summons was served on the De-
fendant on June 15, 1964. 
A few days after June 15, 1964, Defendant visited 
plaintiff and plaintiff offered to settle the matter if de-
fendant would purchase another combine for $500.00 and 
would pay plaintiff's attorney's fees in the amount of 
$300.00. Defendant believing the attorney's fees were 
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excessive under the circumstances chose to answer the 
complaint and filed a counterclaim for damages for breach 
of warranty. 
Defendant moved for a Summary Judgment to dismiss 
Plaintiff's complaint on the grounds that the contract was 
not enforceable under Section 15-l-2a, Utah Code An-
notated, 1953. The Court denied Defendant's motion 
and the case was tried before a jury who returned a verdict 
for the Plaintiff. 
STATEMENT OF POINTS 
The Court erred in denying defendant's motion for 
Summary Judgment dismissing Plaintiff's complaint as the 
filing of a complaint declaring the entire amount of a 
conditional sales contract due and payable before maturity 
violates the buyer's right under Section 15-l-2a(B) ( 4), 
Utah Code Annotated, 1953, to pay the full indebtedness 
of the contract at any time prior to final maturity. 
ARGUMENT 
THE FILING OF A COMPLAINT DECLARING THE 
ENTIRE AMOUNT OF A CONDITIONAL SALES 
CONTRACT DUE AND PAYABLE BEFORE MATUR-
ITY VIOLATES THE BUYER'S RIGHT UNDER SEC-
TION 15-l-2a (B) (4) UTAH CODE ANNOTATED, 
1953, TO PAY THE FULL INDEBTEDNESS OF THE 
CONTRACT AT ANY TIME PRIOR TO FINAL J\,1A-
TURITY. 
This appears to be a case of novel impression. De-
fendant has been unable to find a statute similar to Sec-
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tion 15-l-2a, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, and therefore 
cases from other jurisdictions are inapplicable here. The 
Utah Supreme Court in Dusenberry v. Taylor, 7 Utah 2d 
383, 325 P2d 910 considered the second paragraph of sub-
divisiort ··(B) (5) of Section 15-l-2a and said "that the 
provision next last quoted seems almost absurd" but held 
that the literal reading of the statute was "understandable 
and clear" and even though "there appears on the surface 
no good reason for enacting such legislation" the Court 
said "We cannot say it is void because the legislature 
used language leading to almost senseless results." Since 
the Supreme Court of Utah has indicated the language of 
the statute is clear, no citation to cases interpreting similar 
language appear appropriate. 50 Am. Jur., Statutes, Sec-
tion 225-227, p. 204-212. 82 C. J. S., Statutes Sec. 322 
( 2), p. 577 et. seq. In Re Stevens Estate, 107 Utah 255 
at 259, 130 P2d 85 where the Court said: 
"The language of the statute is plain and its meaning is 
clear, in which case there is no occasion to search for its 
meaning beyond the statute itself." 
The pertinent part of the stahite provides: 
" ( 4) Any provision in any conditional sale contract for the 
sale of personal property to the contrary notwithstanding, 
the buyer may satisfy in full the indebtedness evidenced 
by such contract at any time before the final maturity 
thereof." 
" ( 5) If the seller ... shall violate any provision of sub-
divisions ( 3) ·. or ( 4) of this subsection the conditional 
contra~t shall not be enforceable." 
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Defendant submits that when upon filing its complaint 
on May 20, 1964, Plaintiff declared the entire balance of 
the contract due and payable over five months prior to 
the final maturity date (see paragraphs 5 and 8 of Plain-
tiffs complaint) and brought suit for this amount plus 
attorney's fees and interest it was a violation of subdivision 
( 4) above quoted and therefore the contract is not en-
forceable as provided in subdivision ( 5). There are only 
two actions the Seller can take to violate the quoted 
provision of subdivision ( 4) and suffer the penalty set 
forth in subdivision ( 5). One is by refusing to accept 
an advance payment by the buyer and the other is to 
demand the entire unpaid balance before maturity as 
Plaintiff did in this instance. (Accidental or bona fide 
errors in computation are not subject to the penalty). 
Not only is defendant's interpretation required by 
the plain language of the statute, but such interpretation 
is also reasonable and not absurd as is the portion of the 
statute discussed in Dusenberry v. Taylor, supra. In the 
first place the entire statute is written favorably to the 
seller. The seller may omit to do nearly every one of the 
mandatory items required by the statute for the protection 
of the buyer and yet the legislature says the contract is 
still enforceable (see second paragraph of subdivision 
B ( 5) and Dusenberry v. Taylor, supra). The conditional 
seller is not a small loan company which requires high 
interest rates to stay in business, still the seller is permitted 
to charge one per cent time price differential on the unpaid 
balance for each month the contract price is unpaid which 
permits an interest rate of twenty-five per cent or higher. 
This is, as the Court says in the case of Dusenberry v. 
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Taylor, supra., "one of the highest (interest rates) found 
in our statutes." The Seller may also sue for delinquent 
installments and recover collection costs, attorney's fees 
and interest on such delinquent installments. Since nearly 
everything in the Statute is for the benefit of the seller, 
and since in subsection A( 8) the legislature indicates the 
statute was written for the benefit of the buyer, it seems 
some provision in the statute should be for the buyer's 
benefit. Especially since the title of the statute says it 
is to provide "for the maximum rates to be charged" which 
from the buyer's point of view includes not only the in-
terest rate, but collection costs and attorney's fees as well. 
Defendant submits that the provision the legislature 
included for the benefit of the buyer is that the seller may 
not exercise an accelerated maturity clause in conditional 
sales contracts as the Plaintiff did in this case. In other 
words, the Seller can only bring suit for delinquent install-
ments, and consequently cannot bring suit for the entire 
purchase price until after the final maturity date of the 
contract on conditional sales contracts under $7500 cov-
ered by this statute. 
Such interpretation is reasonable because it protects 
the buyer from unreasonable action by the Seller. For 
example we may assume a conditional sales contract for 
an used automobile. The selling price is $1500, the 
buyer pays $300 down and agrees to pay the balance in 
12 equal monthly installments. The Seller charges the 
maximum time price differential of $144 and makes a 
contract for 12 monthly payments of $112 each. The car 
does not operate properly so the buyer becomes irritated 
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and even though he is able to pay he does not pay the 
first installment. In absence of the statute as interpreted 
by the Defendant here the seller could immediately de-
clare the entire balance of $1344 due and payable without 
asking the buyer about his problem and the seller could 
bring action for the $1344 plus attorneys fees of $201 or 
$1545. The seller obtains judgment and attaches the car. 
Assume the seller is again able to sell the car for $1500 
the buyer has paid the $300 down payment, plus the 
judgment of $1545 less the $1500 obtained on resale, or 
$345 for the privilege of using the car for one month. 
And if the Seller on the Sheriff's sale does not get the 
$1500 originally paid by the buyer, but gets only $1000 
then the buyer has paid $845 for the privilege of using 
the car one month, or over half the price of the auto-
mobile in the first place. (To state it differently, the 
buyer is paying interest at a rate of from 45% to 545%). 
In order to guard against such unconscionable contracts, 
the legislature has wisely prohibited the enforcement of 
clauses accelerating the maturity of conditional sales con-
tracts. 
Does such an interpretation work a hardship on the 
Seller. The Seller may still bring suit for delinquent in-
stallments and may still recover his collection costs, at-
torney's fees and interest on delinquent installments. The 
legislature specifically reserved these rights in Section 
( 4) and the exclusion of any language which states that 
the seller may still use the accelerated maturity clause 
also indicates the legislature wished to delete this remedy. 
See 50 Am. Jur. Statutes, Sec. 429, p. 450. Or the seller 
can exercise his rights under the usual conditional sales 
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contract provlSlons and repossess the property because 
of delinquency in payments. The seller now has his down 
payment and he has his property back. If the property 
has decreased in value to such an extent that he cannot 
recover his loss upon a resale of the property. he can still 
bring his action against the buyer for the contract price 
upon completion of the contract period. But if the pro-
perty is in a merchantable condition he can resell the pro-
perty and after the final maturity of the contract the seller 
can bring an action for any difference between the bal-
ance due and the sale price of the property and obtain a 
deficiency judgment. But in all these remedies the buyer 
is protected against paying unreasonable interest costs and 
attorney's fees where he has defaulted. 
Defendant's interpretation of the statute does equity 
under Defendant's understanding of the fact situation at 
issue (which is only cited as an example since Judgment 
was for plaintiff in the District Court). Here the Defen-
dant returned the combine and thought the contract had 
been cancelled with the Plaintiff retaining the combine 
plus the down payment. Suddenly without prior warning 
and without a demand for the delinquent installment and 
before the final maturity date of the contract the defen-
dant is served with summons demanding the entire con-
tract balance plus $300 in attorney's fees and interest. 
The Defendant made an attempt in June 1964 to 
settle the entire matter without suit. The parties reached 
a settlement except they were unable to agree on the 
amount of Plaintiff's attorney's fees. The plaintiff's at-
torney asked for the full amount to which she was en-
titled if the entire balance of the contract was due or as 
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provided in the contract 15 per cent of $1924 rounded to 
$300. If Plaintiff had not violated the provision of Section 
15-l-2a(B) (4) which permits the buyer to pay the bal-
ance at any time before final maturity and had only 
brought suit for the first installment of $941.54, the at-
torney's fees would have been limited to $142.00 under 
the provisions of the contract. This may have been a 
figure which the defendant would have accepted since his 
actions indicated he needed a combine to perform work 
for the 1964 season. 
The action of the District Court in denying the de-
fendant's motion for Summary Judgment and permitting 
trial on the first installment before the final maturity 
date of the contract does not change the fact that plain-
tiff violated the provisions of Section 15-l-2a ( B) ( 4) in 
demanding the entire balance before the final maturity 
of the contract. Plaintiff's action was ill-advised and it 
must now accept the penalty provided by the legislature 
in subdivision ( 5) which makes the contract unenforce-
able and requires the Plaintiff to be content with the 
return of the combine and the retention of the down pay-
ment. 
To hold that the seller may before maturity declare 
the entire amount of the contract due and then claim 
there is no violation of subdivision ( 4) because the 
buyer can always hire an attorney and have the seller's 
complaint reduced by the court to the amount then owing 
seems to thwart the intent of the legislature. The legisla-
ture gave a right to all buyers under conditional sales 
contracts to pay the entire amount at any time before 
final maturity. If a seller can violate this right by declar-
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ing the entire balance due without penalty, sellers mav 
take the risk that the buyer in temporary financial diffi-
culty will be unable to hire an attorney to contest the 
seller's violation of the buyer's right. The majority of 
buyers may conclude the seller had the right under the 
acceleration clause in the conditional sales contract and 
will allow judgment by default to be taken in the hope 
they can eventually work themselves out of the difficulty 
of not only paying an extremely high interest rate but 
attorney's fees and collection costs as well. Or the buyer 
may proceed in ignorance of the law and settle the matter 
not knowing the entire balance is not due and the at-
torney's fees allowable may not be so high. 
But if this Court will enforce the legislative intent 
and will permit the seller who violates the law by declar-
ing the entire balance due before maturity to be penalized 
by refusing to enforce the contract, then the legislative 
purpose of fixing maximum rates to be charged on con-
ditional sales contracts will be served. The seller can still 
bring action for delinquent installments and obtain re-
covery of collection costs and attorney's fees thereon, but 
the buyer will have the additional time to work out his 
problems he contracted for in agreeing to pay the high 
interest rate, without also being required to pay the ad-
ditional interest costs, collection costs and attorney's fees 
on installments not yet due which may make the goal of 
eventually paying one's debts seem hopeless and unat-
tainable. 
CONCLUSION 
This Court should not permit the seller who violates 
the law by declaring the entire contract balance due be-
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fore final maturity to escape the penalty provided by the 
legislature in Section 15-l-2a(B) (5), Utah Code An-
notated, 1953. 
Respectfully submitted, 
L. Tom Perry 
Ted S. Perry 
Attorneys for Defendant-
Appellant Howard F. Croshaw 
106 Church St. 
Logan, Utah 
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